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Abstract: With time the use of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles)/drones is increasing across several 
civil and military application domains. Such domains include real-time monitoring, remote sensing, 
wireless coverage in a disaster area, search and rescue, delivery of goods, surveillance, security, 
agriculture, civil infrastructure inspection, and the list goes on. This rapid growth is opening doors to 
numerous opportunities and conveniences in everyday life. On the other hand, security and privacy 
concerns for unmanned aerial vehicles/drones are progressively increasing. With limited 
standardization and regulation of unmanned aerial vehicles/drones, security and privacy concerns are 
quite frightful. This paper presents a brief analysis of unmanned aerial vehicle's/drones security and 
privacy-related concerns. The paper also presents countermeasures and recommendations to address 
such concerns. To give a brief knowledge about unmanned aerial vehicles/drones, the paper also 
provide readers with up-to-date information on existing regulations, classification, architecture, and 
communication methods, application areas, vulnerabilities, existing countermeasures against different 
attacks, and their limitations. In the end, the paper concludes with a discussion on open research areas 
and recommendations on how the security and privacy of unmanned aerial vehicles can be improved.               
Keywords: UAV, Drone, UAV security, UAV privacy, UAV applications, UAV countermeasures, 
UAV threats, UAV architecture, blockchain.  
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1. Introduction  
For ages, the advancement of technology is one of the most promising and fruitful evolution. 
Bundled with uncertainty, technical advancements are successfully providing reliable, affordable, and 
user-friendly solutions to the problems we face in everyday life. Although the future is unknown, 
digital innovation continues to shape the future-encouraging people to adopt new hobbies and ways of 
interacting with everyday work and people. In recent times, UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles)/drones 
are among the most prominent and rapidly increasing areas of interest for industrial, military, and 
personal applications. Research conducted by CUAVI (China Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry) 
predicted that the market scope of small domestic UAVs would be approximately 75 billion Yuan in 
China by 2025 [1]. The FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) highlighted that almost 2.5 million 
drones are presently flying in the US that is likely to reach almost 7 million drones by 2020 [2]. This 
rise in UAV/drone usage is due to several factors i.e. growing demand for live streaming, real-time 
video shooting, image capture capabilities, mobility, ease of usage, etc. The UAV/drones have also 
been used for small goods transportation and last-mile delivery as they are easy to deploy, require low 
maintenance, have unique hovering ability, and have high mobility. The UAV/drones are also proving 
to be very effective in the domain of security, surveillance, and rescue operations [3, 4]. On the other 
hand, the security concerns of UAVs are quite concerning to the stakeholders. In one incident, the 
Iranian military was able to take down a U.S. Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel drone by jamming 
the UAV’s control signals [5]. Due to the design limitations and hostile operational domain, developing 
a full-proof security module for UAV/drones is a challenge for security experts. In terms of UAV/drone 
history, the earliest record of a UAV/drone dates back to the 18th century [6]. Apparently, in 1849 the 
Australians used unmanned balloons filled with explosives to attack Venice in Italian [7]. In 1915, the 
British military used unmanned balloons for photographic-based surveillance in the Battle of Neuve 
Chapelle [8]. During the early 19th century, cameras were not very advanced and different methods 
were used to enhance the visibility of the photograph taken by a camera attached to these floating 
objects [8].  
The United States commenced UAV development during the First World War. In 1916, the US 
developed the first pilotless aircraft that could fly a steered distance of 1000 yards. Later in World War 
II, the US developed further advanced UAVs including the Curtiss N2C-2 drone and the Radio plane 
OQ-2 [9]. Despite a long history of military-based applications, UAVs were considered unreliable and 
expensive. However, in the 1980s this aspect began to change with the US leading the way to develop 
economical UAVs. In the 1990s and 2000, miniature and micro UAVs were introduced. During the 
2000 afghan war, it was a Predator drone that located Osama bin Label in Afghanistan [10]. Although, 
UAV’s were originally developed for military purposes. However, studies showed that it has a high 
potential in numerous domestic applications. In 2014, Amazon initially suggested using UAVs for 
delivery purposes [6]. Later UAVs/drone's potential was explored by several domestic domains i.e., 
agriculture [1] [2], construction, law enforcement, search and rescue, photography for real state, 
cinematography, etc. With this exponential growth of the application domain, UAV/drone’s security 
and privacy concerns became more severe. The core idea of this paper is to give readers an in-depth 
view of the rising security-related concerns of UAV/drones. To give a clear idea of these security and 
privacy concerns The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the existing regulation 
for UAVs. In section 3 covers the classification of both drones and UAVs. Drone architecture and 
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communication methods are discussed in section 4. Detailed discussion on the applications of 
drone/UAVs is discussed in section 5. Drone/UAV security vulnerabilities and threats are covered in 
section 6. Section 7 covers the existing threats for drones/UAVs. Existing solutions and 
countermeasures for UAV/drone security are discussed in section 8. The physical and logical attack 
countermeasures are discussed in section 9. The limitations of existing security measures are discussed 
in section 10. Section 11 covers a brief overview of drone/UAV open research areas. Recommendations 
for improving security and privacy-related concerns for drones/UAVs with a summary of the paper are 
presented in section 12. Section 12 also presents a comparison between this paper and recent survey 
papers. Section 13 concludes the article.    
2. Regulations 
Licensing of photographic or normal UAV/drone is quite a concern in terms of privacy as well as 
security. Although governments all over the world are urging their citizens to have their UAV/drones 
licensed [11] [12]. The concern of an unlicensed UAV flying over private territories or sensitive 
military areas is growing with time. In Lebanon, unlicensed or illegal drones are typically taken down 
and legal action is taken against the owner since such drones impose grave security risks to government 
institutes and public safety [11]. As per BBC News (British Broadcasting Corporation) [13], the CAA 
(Civil Aviation Authority) and FAA [14] announced some basic drone operation codes for the owners 
to follow, which are: 
• Register your UAV/drone and always carry the registration proof when operating. 
• UAV/drones are not allowed to fly over 400 feet. 
• UAV/drone operators are not allowed to fly near airfields. If there is a need to operate a UAV/drone 
near an airfield, permission must be acquired in advance from the relevant authorities.  
• Due to public safety concerns, UAV/drones should be operated carefully or legal action can be 
taken against the harmful actions of a UAV/drone operator  
• UAV/drones with cameras are not allowed to fly within 50m of people, animals, structures, or 
vehicles. 
• Keep the UAV/drone in the operator's line of sight.  
• Do not fly at night without proper lights on the UAV/drone. 
The mentioned rules present a very general outline of UAV/drone operation. With the dramatic 
increase of the drone market in recent times, each country and state have defined their own rules and 
regulations for UAV/drone operators [15].  
 
A typical drone/UAV of three main components. First the ground control station or ground 
command and control. Second is the communication link, which could be through satellite, 
telecommunication infrastructure, or even through another drone. The third component is the 
drone/UAV itself. Detailed discussion about the architecture of drones/UAVs will be covered in a later 
section. Three default ways of drone/UAV communication are through Satellite, Radio Signal, and the 
Internet. As shown in Figure 1 [16] a drone/UAV can be controlled or communicated through satellite, 
telecom infrastructure, and internet i.e. IoTs, drones, UAV, etc.  
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Figure 1. Default ways of drone/UAV communication through the ground command and 
control station. 
The most common frequencies for controlling UAV/drones from the ground are frequencies for 
license-exempt radio equipment. Table 1 highlight the most common frequencies for command and 
control link [17]. 
Table 1. Common Frequencies for ground-based command and control for Drone/UAV. 
Frequency Details about ground control and control equipment 
2400.000 – 2483.500 
MHz 
≤ 100 mW, if the associated standard is EN 300 328 (Digital wideband data 
transmission equipment) 
≤ 10 mW, if the appropriate standard is EN 300 440 (General short-range 
devices). 
5470.000 – 5725.000 
MHz 
The transmitter's operational power is ≤ 1W and the power spectral density of 
transmission is ≤ 50 mW/1 MHz. The appropriate standard is EN 301 893 
(RLAN equipment). 
The use of the mentioned frequency may change as it is under discussion within 
international cooperation and awaits a final decision. 
5725.000 – 5875.000 
MHz 
The transmitter's operative power is ≤ 25mW and the appropriate standard is 
EN 300 440 (General short-range devices) 
5030 – 5091 MHz 
As per the International Telecommunication Union ITU, the frequency is 
assigned to the command and control of UAV or drones in cargo and passenger 
traffic and so it cannot be used for ground-based UAVs or drones. 
 
Further standardization by ISO (International Organization for Standardization) committee 
ISO/TC 20/SC 16 [18] is still working to finalize standards for operating UAV/drones.   
3. Classification  
Every UAV is a drone; however, not all drones can be classified as UAVs. A drone can be defined 
as an unmanned aircraft that is controlled remotely or autonomously. A UAV is something that can fly 
without a pilot on board [19]. 
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3.1. Drones Classification 
The term drone is typically referred to as remotely (autonomously) controlled aircraft. This 
definition could include both submarines and land-based autonomous vehicles. Based on their flying 
mechanics, flying drones can generally be classified into three main types [20]. 
  
• Multi-Rotor Drones or Rotary-wing drones: Their main feature is the Vertical Take-off and Landing 
(VTOL) ability. Additionally, their ability to hover and high maneuverability play an important 
role in different applications.  
• Fixed-Wing Drones: These types of drones are energy efficient compared to rotary-based drones. 
This is due to their capability to fly at high speed and glide. These drones can carry heavy payloads. 
The only concern for these types of drones is the runway, as they are Horizontal Take-Off and 
Landing (HTOL) drones.   
• Hybrid-Wing Drones: As the name suggest, these type of drones have both fixed and rotary wings. 
These drones use gliding ability to travel fast, while rotary to perform hovering-based tasks. 
3.2. UAVs Classification 
A UAV can fly remotely (autonomously) based on a ground command and control mechanism 
using a controller, mobile phone, or computer [21]. UAV’s can be classified by their ability to fly 
autonomously over long distances. UAV control can be classified into three main types. 
 
• Full autonomous control: Fully automated to perform different tasks. 
• Remote supervised control: Based on tasks, the UAV can be automated and can operate by a human 
operator. 
• Remote pilot control: Human-based remote command and control. 
 
The referenced classifications have their own merits and demerits. Brief information regarding 
these drones/UAVs classifications can be seen in Table 2 [22]. 
Table 2 Drone/UAV Basic Classification 
Based on wing type Based on altitude 
Rotary-wing Fixed-wing Hybrid Low altitude platform High altitude platform 
• Can hover 
• Less battery life 
then fixed-wing 
• Low speed 
• Typical battery time 
1-hour flight 
• Similar to small 
aircraft 
• Cannot hover 
• Can transport a high 
payload 
• High speed 
• Battery life several 
hours 
• Have both fixed 
and rotary wings 
• Can glide over 
the air and hover 
using rotary 
• Quick and flexible 
deployment 
• Quick mobility 




• High endurance (days 
or months) 
• Wide area coverage 
• Quasi-stationary 
Altitude above 17km 
Some recent research work prefers to classify drones/UAVs based on their altitude. Figure 2 shows 
drone/UAV classification based on their altitude with some common examples [23]. 
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Figure 2. Drone/UAV classification based on altitude. 
4. Drone/UAV Architecture and Communication methods 
Most of the commercial UAVs/drones are low-cost and remotely controlled types of equipment. 
A huge variety of commercial and military UAVs/drones exist today. Mini and micro UAVs are gaining 
popularity for both commercial military applications. However, there are limitations in their 
application due to size and weight restrictions. On the other hand, Tier II & III UAVs/drones, contain 
reasonability high resources (refer to Figure 2). Almost every UAV/drone is equipped with a 
combination of sensors, GPS, CPU, communication module, and batteries as shown in Figure 3. Due 
to advancements in technology, UAVs/drones are reaching a point where they will find applicability 
in both commercial and military scenarios. It is believed that the lack of software and hardware support 
are the two main issues affecting the realization of their full potential [24]. 
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Even though dependable autonomous UAVs exist, the main objective is to achieve the mission 
with additional payloads (i.e. sensors, camera, etc.). UAVs for defense or military applications are 
tailored for specific objectives and those equipment are not openly available for commercial UAVs 
application. As shown in Figure 3, a typical UAV can be broken down into five components. 
• Drone/UAV airframe: The airframe of a drone/UAV must be very simple, aerodynamic, lightweight, 
and a stable platform for the equipment.  Size and weight are a constraint for any UAV, so efficient 
use of space is critical.       
• Onboard computer: Onboard CPU is the heart of a drone/UAV. The onboard computer serves as 
the collector, collaborator, and controller for flight, onboard equipment, and sensors (i.e. GPS, 
camera, accelerometer, gyros, magnetometer, pressure, etc.)   
• Payload: Drones/UAVs are utilized for several different purposes. Drones/UAVs designed for 
public and commercial use have different payload attachments compared to those developed for 
military applications. Examples of payloads include sensors, high definition cameras, infrared 
sensors, heat sensors, radiation sensors, or any military mission-based equipment, etc.   
• Communication system: Every drone/UAV requires a set of communication systems. Either 
remotely controlled or automated. Communication equipment (i.e. radio, modem, sitcom, etc.) 
guarantees uninterrupted communication between UAV and its ground base station.     
• Battery: Different UAVs have different requirements for the power source. Power sources are 
based on their size, objective, and range. Most of the Mini and Micro UAVs have Lithium power 
batteries [25]. 
4.1. Communication Methods 
Communication plays an integral part for both fully automated or remotely controlled UAVs. To 
engineer a suitable suite for UAVs, the communication protocols, communication network, and 
communication model play an integral part [26]. Several researchers have proposed different network 
architectures, antenna designs, and communication methods. As shown in Figure 4 there are three basic 
methods for UAV communication at different altitudes [27]. 
 
Figure 4. UAV/drone communication methods for different altitudes. 
With the introduction of highly capable 5G networks, some issues like data rate, coverage, and 
latency can be addressed. The improvement with the advancement in communication technology can 
play a significant role for UAVs in critical missions. Some of the key parameters of the different 
communication technologies (including Wi-Fi and cellular communication) can be seen in Table 3 [28].   
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Most of the UAVs communicate based on LOS (Line of sight), but when it comes to high altitude 
UAV/drones, LOS-based communication as in Table 3 is not suitable other than GPS. For BLOS 
(Beyond line of sight), Table 4 gives a brief overview of LEO (Low Earth Orbit), MEO (Medium Earth 
Orbit), and GEO (Geostationary Earth Orbit) satellites [29].   
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Communication plays a vital role in the UAV/drone role and its architecture. Based on the mission 
and architecture of the UAV/drone, different communication modules are installed. Several 
UAVs/drones can carry a wide variety of payloads or attached modules based on the operational 
requirements [26]. 
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5. Drone/UAV application areas   
In the era of new scientific developments, expectations from UAVs/drone's potential are on the 
higher side. The applications of UAVs cover a huge domain ranging from personal use to military 
applications as shown in Figure 5 [30]. Drones and UAVs can be equipped with several different 
sensors, cameras, and other payloads to perform many different tasks. UAVs/drones can have over two 
hundred applications based on how they are used and what payload is attached [31]. Due to rapid 
deployment, diligence, ability to reach areas where humans can't reach, low risk, low budget, mobility, 
and numerous payload options drone/UAV applications are always increasing and improving.     
 
Figure 5. Drone/UAV applications 
5.1. Application Domain 
Drones/UAVs will play a key role in the coming future. As shown in Figure 5 the application 
areas for UAVs/drones keep on increasing every day. Based on applications and types of drones/UAVs, 
they can also be classified into diverse domains of usage. The fact that drones/UAV follows an 
architecture based on their application, dividing them into domains can be very effective for a better 
understanding of their challenges and architecture. Figure 6 gives a brief overview of drone/UAV usage 
domain classification [32, 33]. Based on the domain-based classification in Figure 6, it is clear that 
each domain has its own special need in terms of security and privacy. 
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Figure 6. Drone/UAV application based domain classification 
6. Drone/UAV security vulnerabilities and threats 
The use of drone/UAV offer numerous benefits and with the progress of technology, these benefits 
keep on increasing. On the other hand, they suffer from diverse security, privacy, and safety issues. 
Keeping in view that some type of drone/UAV have limited resources to operate will require special 
consideration for security measures [34, 35]. Due to the nature of applications associated with UAVs 
and drones, the privacy and security issues should be addressed with high priority. Further 
regularization, licensing, and strict measures to limit UAV-based photography and surveillance should 
be among the priorities for authorities all over the world. In terms of network security and risk analysis, 
network coverage provided by a UAV is not similar to any Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) or Mobile 
Ad-hoc Network (MANETs) [36]. This is due to resource constraints as UAV-based coverage is wider 
and broader as compared to WSN and MANETs. In terms of AAA (Authorization Authentication 
Accounting), the following guidelines can be effective for UAVs:  
   
• Authorization: Assigning privileges to the controller of the UAV to avoid any hostile takeover with 
administrative rights.    
• Authentication: There must be a rigid authentication method for UAVs to avoid unauthorized 
access and control.  
• Accounting: In case of any illegal activity by a UAV/drone, the owner can be tracked down. 
  
With mini/micro drone/UAVs easily accessible, mischievous or criminal entities can use them for 
conducting illegal surveillance, cyber-attack, privacy threats to any individual or organization. Various 
mechanical and operational capabilities of drones/UAVs are being exploited for conducting malicious 
activities [37]. Such events make UAV/drone growth a double-edged sword, the effort to make them 
more secure and rigid also makes them more effective for malicious activities.   
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6.1.  Security Concerns 
Due to their small size, low cost, availability, maintenance, and maneuverability UAVs are a 
perfect choice for criminal activity. For example, terrorists and criminals use UAVs to conduct harmful 
activities. The ability to carry a wide range of attachments makes UAVs effective couriers for harmful 
chemicals or explosive items. Additionally, their ability to reach places where humans cannot makes 
them useful. They can carry anything unnoticed or stealthily [38].     
6.2.  Safety Concerns 
Security is not the only concern for drones/UAVs. Any drone flying over populated areas or 
property can malfunction and crash. Such crashes can be harmful to buildings and can injure people 
[39]. Such incidents have been reported all over the world. Human injuries due to a UAV/drone are 
unfortunately common. In April 2016, a UAV hit a passenger jet (British AirwaysBA727). Due to these 
accidents, a few public safety measures can be considered: 
 Safety Feature: There is a high probability that a UAV/drone can be hacked or go out of control 
due to strong winds. Under such circumstances, there should be an option to shut it down or to 
regain control again.  
 Weak Signal or jamming: Signal jamming makes UAVs/drones venerable to hacking and hijacking 
as part of a cyber-attack.     
 Design/Architecture safety: Most of the UAV/drones that are easily accessible to the public are 
rotary-based types as shown in Figure 7. 
  
 
Figure 7. Commonly available types of drone/UAV 
These drones can have additional safety features as shown in some products in Figure 8. 
Understandably adding such measures affects the architecture and may introduce some performance 
concerns, but safety must be a higher priority. A standard should be introduced regarding safety 
measures for publically available drones/UAVs. Such standards should also include crash avoidance 
features.   
 
Figure 8. UAVs/drones with additional safely measure 
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6.3. Privacy Concern 
 Privacy concerns are rife due to the ease with which anyone can procure UAVs with high-
definition cameras and gadgets. People can be easily recorded or observe within their private property 
without them knowing. Per Canadian Public Safety (CPS), UAVs have upstretched quite a few safety, 
security, and privacy concerns [40]. Taking pictures or recording people without their consent has 
resulted in blackmail and other criminal activities. Legal policies regarding taking private photos or 
videos without consent using UAVs, flying through premises, or hovering at window level should be 
introduced for UAV operations.   
7. Existing threats for drones/UAVs 
Due to a lack of standardization, several UAVs currently in the market have considerable design 
issues. One of the most concerning of these issues is the unavailability of wireless security [41]. 
Table 5. Common Threads/Vulnerability of UAVs/drones 
Thread/Vulnerability Details 
Malware Infection Most of the UAV controllers are based on a cellphone, remote control, laptop, or 
wireless remote control. These techniques are not secure [42], as they enable hackers 
to generate a reverse-shell TCP payload, which can be injected into UAV memory. 
This can result in the stealthy installation of harmful malware on the UAV controller.  
Spoofing  The exploration of configuration and remote controllers of UAVs/drones’ rotor-
based models, exposed some vulnerability issues. These issues are associated with 
the communication link via serial port connections, which are usually not encrypted 
[43]. Experiments highlight that by GPS spoofing; information can be taken, altered, 
or even injected into the UAVs.         
Manipulation As most of the drones/UAVs follow pre-programmed flying routes, manipulation of 
those routes can be implemented [44]. Such manipulation can help steal precious 
cargo and can even direct a drone to attack a different target.  
Natural concern While flying, the UAV/drone can face many natural issues. Strong wind, lightning, 
overheating due to surrounding temperature, etc. . Some predator birds can also cause 
issues for any lightweight and small UAV/drone [45].   
Technical Problems Several drones/UAVs counter technical issues both hardware and software-based. 
Glitches and technical issues are a part of every system. UAV’s suffer issues which 
may include battery issues, crashes due to wing or rotor malfunction, remote 
controller communication issues, etc.  
Attack on sensors Drones/UAVs rely on different sensors to perform their task and to operate. Son Y et 
al [46] experimented and showed how ultrasonic waves can be used to perform an 
attack on MEMS gyroscope. They showed how certain frequencies could destroy a 
UAV’s gyroscope.    
Wi-Fi security Some drones/UAVs can be remotely piloted using smart devices through Wi-Fi, 
which is a security risk. In an experiment [47] in which two Wi-Fi connection 
software’s Mavic and Spark from the same company were used. It was observed that 
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the connection to the UAV was disrupted with the help of other software, requesting 
UAV control.     
ADS-B security Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is one of the aircraft's 
operation monitoring technology, which is based on GPS and is used for 
communication. Aircraft are equipped with both ADS-B in and out, while a UAV is 
only equipped with ADS-B in. ADS-B broadcast is intended for all aircraft and is not 
encrypted, which means any criminal can use a UAV and GPS spoofing device to 
disrupt such broadcasts and cause harm to aircraft traffic [48].   
Zero-Day 
Vulnerability 
Zero-Day vulnerabilities are one of the common bugs in software and firmware. 
These bugs are unknown by the time of product release but with time vendors release 
patches to overcome these bugs. Attacks through such vulnerabilities were 
successfully experimented on in a UAV control stream [49] using Parrot Bebop.  
De-authentication 
attack  
De-authentication attacks target the control stream between the controller and the 
UAV. There are software such as ‘SkyJack’, which can be used to conduct such 
attacks on vulnerable UAVs [50].  
Video-Replay attack These attacks are quite harmful and target the Operation Control Unit (OCU). These 
attacks puzzle the controller by changing the live feed to some other video. While a 
human operator might be able to notice the difference an autonomous UAV might 
find this attack difficult to handle [51].    
 
Some researchers also conducted different types of cyber-attack on UAVs in a controlled 
environment to test the effects and vulnerability [49]. Such experiments include: 
 
• DoS Attack: Researchers used parallel requests for controlling UAVs. The high amount of requests 
overload the response and crash the UAV system.     
• Buffer-Overflow: In such an attack, the researchers modified the packet request for controlling the 
drone/UAV and crashed the system responsible for controlling the drone/UAV.  
• ARP Attack: In Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) attack, the researcher used the cache-poisoning 
approach and it resulted in the disconnection of the UAV from its controller. 
 
Other than communication links or attacks on ground control, a different aspect of cyber-attacks 
on UAV is the attack on the operating system (OS) or micro-controller unit of a UAV. In most cases, 
these OS for UAVs is very similar to smartphones OS. Due to this similarity, several attacks effective 
against smartphone OS are also useful on UAV systems [52]. With the advancement of technology and 
UAV, attack vectors on UAVs are always on a rise. The probability of attack types can be unlimited in 
the current era of technology. Figure 9 shows the attacks that are being reported or being conducted 
successfully for educational purposes [50, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57]. Among the attacks highlighted in 
the section, GPS spoofing is one of the most common cyber-attack on UAVs/drones. Among the most 




Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering  Volume x, Issue x, 1-X Page. 
 
Figure 9. Drone/UAV Attack Vector with reported incidence or educational purpose in 
grey. 
8. Existing Solutions and Counter Measures for UAV/Drone Security 
The first counter-measure for resolving security threats on drones/UAV is classifying the attacks 
types, intended target, and objective of the attack. Table 6 shows some of the most proponent cyber-
attacks conducted against UAVs/drones. The table also highlights the nature of the attack and some 
security measures against the attacks [57]. Most of the attacks highlighted in Table 6 target the 
authentication process of a UAV/drone. This highlights the need for improvement in the authentication 
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  Table 6. Cyber-attack types and counter in UAV/drones 
Attack Nature Target Security Measure 
Malware Infection 
Privacy, Integrity, Data 
confidentiality, Availability, 
Authentication 
Light-weight IDS, control 
Access policies, multi-factor 
authentication, system integrity 
Injection/Modification Exploitation Privacy, Integrity 
ML-based IDS, time stamping, 
message authentication, digital 
signature 
Eavesdropping Interception Privacy, Data confidentiality 
Secure communication, secure 
connection 
Man in the middle Authentication 
Privacy, Data confidentiality, 
Integrity 
Light hybrid IDS, multi-factor 
authentication, lightweight but 
strong cryptography 
authentication methods 
Wi-Fi Air crack Cracking Authentication 
Physical layer lightweight IDS, 
Strong & periodic password, 
strong encryption 
Wi-Fi Jamming Jamming Authentication 
Frequency hopping, frequency 
range variation, Strong & 
periodic password, strong 
encryption 
De-Authentication Jamming Authentication 
Frequency hopping, frequency 
range variation 
Replay attack Jamming Authentication 
Frequency hopping, time-
stamping 
Buffer Overflow Jamming Authentication 
Frequency hopping, frequency 
range variation 
DoS Jamming Authentication 
Frequency hopping, frequency 
range variation 
ARP attack Jamming Authentication 
Frequency hopping, frequency 
range variation 
GPS Spoofing Jamming Authentication 
Return-to-base function or 
protocol, frequency range 
variation 
8.1. Current Countermeasures 
The wireless-based communication network suffers from numerous security issues and threats. 
In recent times, machine learning (ML) based intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been quite 
successful against network threats. As machine learning-based solutions require higher resources, 
several researchers are working on how resources can be managed in ML-based IDS [58]. Blockchain 
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is also among the most effective approach for UAV/drone security and privacy [11].  
8.1.1. UAV/Drone communication network security 
Keeping up with the current requirements of network security ML-based IDS are among the most 
successful tools. Generally, IDS are categorized into three types: 
 
• Rule-Based: These types of IDS are used in the UAV domain [59] and the objective is to identify 
false data-injection attacks, specifically those who target signal strength between UAV and ground 
control. Rule-based IDS can be effective against known attack patterns and techniques. Conversely, 
these types of IDS cannot detect the new or complex types of attacks and require human interaction 
to counter such attacks.    
• Signature-Based: Some researchers have also used signature-based IDS on UAV. In a paper [60], 
the authors used a bio-inspired cyber-attack method that attacks air-born networks.   Like rule-
based IDS, signature-based IDS are also not good against unknown and complex attacks.   
• Anomaly-Based: These types of IDS are used against jamming attacks in UAV networks [61]. 
Jamming attacks include DoS, DDoS, triggering malfunction, and sensors-based attacks. The only 
major issue for anomaly-based ML IDS is the high resource requirement. 
     
As the number of UAVs/drones increase, quite a lot of different solutions for UNV 
communication network are proposed. Some papers [62] identified the physical layer issues in UAV 
communication network and proposed iterative algorithm based on optimizing methods showed an 
improved detection rate of attacks. Similarly, other papers have looked into ADS-B issues, line of sight 
issues, air-to-ground, eavesdropping, and air-to-air wireless communications. Some of the solutions 
proposed by researchers include using modulation, dual antenna, game theory-based algorithm, or Q-
learning-based approaches. In addition to these methods, encryption for secure UAV communication 
is also an important aspect. Researchers have been looking to encryption methods that are not resources 
hungry. Since traditional encryption, methods do not consider resources and delay as an important 
factor [63]. Encryption can not only provide secure communication but can also be very effective in 
the authentication process of a UAV/drone. 
8.1.2. Data Security 
Data captured by a UAV/drone is aggregated onboard the UAV before it is transmitted out. This 
aggregation plays an important part in minimizing network traffic. However, this aggregation and 
encrypting data creates other issues. The symmetric cipher is not secure enough to counter advance 
attack methods and asymmetric cipher requires high computation and high resources. Asymmetric 
cipher also requires additional storage overhead. Due to these constraints, researchers are looking to 
secure, yet lightweight encryption methods for UAV/drone data security. 
8.1.3. Forensic Approaches  
  Digital forensics can plan a vital role in identifying and countering different types of UAV 
attacks. In paper [64] authors presented a generic framework for NF (Network Forensics). The 
framework analysis data traveling through firewalls or IDS to identify any anomaly. The goal of the 
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framework is not only to identify the anomaly but also to track back the source of the activity. Another 
paper [65] has suggested an NF framework involving DIP (Digital Investigation Process) with multiple 
hierarchical digital investigation methods. The approach presented in this paper follows two-tiers. The 
first tier involves assessment, countermeasure, data collection and analysis, the incident report, and 
event closure. Second-tier is an object-based sub-phase [66]. In addition, a UAV/drone forensic process 
can be broken down into three main steps as shown in Table 7 [67]. 
Table 7. UAV/drone forensic process steps 
Steps Details 
1. Preparation a. Identify the chain of command 
b. Identify any fingerprint or identity of UAV 
c. Offensive process of tracking down the owner using time, date, 
location, and identity found on the UAV.   
2. Examination a. Accessing and inspecting data on the UAV i.e. audio, video, pictures, 
etc. 
b. Finding communication method and port 
3. Analysis and Report a. After extracting all the information from the UAV, compiling and 
analyzing them to identify the culprit, its location, or method of 
attack. 
 
Similarly, several other researchers have proposed different methods to use forensic methods to 
counter complex and advanced attacks. The reason for highlighting the forensic method is that with 
time the type and objective of attacks are more complex and difficult to identify [68]. With the help of 
forensic, both perpetrator and method of attack can be identified. With the identification of attack type, 
appropriate countermeasures can be implemented to avoid any future incident. 
9. Physical and Logical Attacks countermeasures 
As per the survey, [69] between 2014 and 2017 incidents among airplanes and drones amplified 
from 6 to 93. Which makes it very important for the authorities to address security and privacy issues 
for UAVs. Due to an increase in cyber-attacks on drones/UAVs, the government needs to introduce 
strict policies and standards to minimize these concerns. With the popularity of UAVs among the 
civilian population, attacks and illegal use of UAVs would likely proliferate. Civilian or domestic UAV 
countermeasures are divided into physical and local countermeasures. Physical countermeasures 
against UAVs can be seen in Table 8. 
Table 8. Physical countermeasures against UAV/drones 
Counter Measure Details 
Drone catcher [70] Bulky drone/UAV are equipped with a net. The net can be shot to capture 
drones/UAVs. 
Drone defender [71] Drone defender (Dedrone) is a radio wave gun that is used to drop drones/UAVs 
down from the sky. 
Electric Fences [72] These are invisible fences and work as a virtual prohibition or wall against 
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UAV/drones. Cloud technology is used to implement them so that every drone in 
the area can identify and avoid these areas. 
Unconventional 
methods [73] 
These methods include training birds of prey i.e. eagles to hunt down any 
drone/UAV in the area. However, these methods include the danger of animals 
being injured by the UAV/drone. 
Keeping in view that logical countermeasure for urban use against UAVs is not high-end tech and 
limited in range and functionality. Table 9 outlines the logical countermeasures against UAV/drones in 
an urban environment.  
Table 9. Logical countermeasures for UAV/drone in an urban environment 
Counter Measure Details 
Wi-Fi jamming [74] Wi-Fi-based drone/UAV operates using a 2.4 GHz frequency. A conventional 
jammer can jam these frequencies within a limited range and can be used for 
privacy purposes.  
Wi-Fi Aircrack [75] Although it is an attacking method, it can be used to take control of any illegal or 
privacy-invading UAV/drone.   
Three-way 
handshake [76] 
Although it is also an attacking method, it can be used to de-authorize or even jam 
communication between the UAV/drone and the controller.   
DoS [77] Websploit Wi-Fi jammer can be an effective method to jam or de-authenticate UAV 
from its controller. However, to conduct DoS based attack, some knowledge about 
the communication channel is required.   
GPS Spoofing [78] Encryption of civilian-based equipment is very costly and making it vulnerable to 
GPS spoofing attacks.   
9.1. Military and Government Counter-measure techniques  
When it comes to military-based countermeasures, resources are not in question. As discussed 
earlier that the use of UAVs/drones is not limited to surveillance, but they are capable of conducting 
attacks or used to pinpoint locations for an attack. Making them quite a dangerous tool on the battlefield. 
Some of the well-known drone/UAV countermeasures can be seen in Figure 10.  
Military all around the globe are well equipped to handle UAV/drone-based threats. Figure 10 
only highlights some of the well-known and publically available information on anti UAV/drones 
weapon systems. Military and Government based organizations also use different methods of detecting 
drones. UAV/drone can be detected based on audio, video, motion, thermal, radio, and RF-based 
methods. All these methods have their own merits and demerits.  
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Figure 10. Some well-known military anti UAV/drone systems. 
Table 10 gives a brief overview of different UAV/drone detection methods [79, 80, 81]. 
UAV/drone can be detected based on audio, video, motion, thermal, radio, and RF-based methods. All 
these methods have their own merits and demerits as highlighted in Table 10.  
Table 10. UAV/drone detection methods 






Can detect signal and 
location of drone/UAV 
Can be countered by using signal 
interference. 
Audio 
8 – 10 
meter 
Not consistent 
Detect drones based on 
the sound it makes 
Can only detect in the short-range 
and have noise interference 
concerns. 
Video 77 meter Average/Bad 
High resolution and 
image 
The high false detection rate 
Thermal 77 meter Good/Bad 
Good in detecting fix-
winged UAV/drone 
Mini/Micro drone does not have a 
high heat signal so thermal-based 






Can identify drones 
easily 





Highly accurate in 
detection and locating 
UAV/drone 
Concerns over detecting and 
locating mini/micro drones 
20 
Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering  Volume x, Issue x, 1-X Page. 
10. Security Implementation Limitations 
Several limitations still exist in adopting and implementing rigid security methods for 
UAVs/drones. Table 11 highlights some of the main issues for UAV/drone security limitations [82, 83, 
84]. Most of the mentioned limitations can be overcome by standardizing UAV/drone design, 
communication protocols, and basic factory default security suits. 
Table 11. UAV/drone security limitations 
Limitation Details 
Availability 
UAV/drones are easily accessible for everyone to purchase. There is no owner 
registration or license registration for purchasing a UAV/drone.     
Design issue 
Due to the absence of standardization, manufacturers are failing to comply with 
necessary requirements i.e. safe design, factory authentication, etc.       
Policies 
Standardization and policies are absent for UAV/drone operations and operators. In 
some countries, policies are defined for UAV/drones flying in proximity of sensitive 
areas. However, a general set of operating policies for a UAV/drone are still not 
available.      
Non-real-time 
countermeasures 
Due to a lack of standardization for design and operational software, the current 
UAV/drones do not have real-time protection during flight. If a UAV/drone is 
compromised during flight it cannot be retained by the original owner.     
Limited testing 
Due to limited testing, the available control and communication units are vulnerable 
to several types of attacks. 
Forensic 
limitations 
In case of a harmful event, the limited availability of forensic tools and methods 
makes it difficult to identify the malicious operator of UAV/drones involved in the 
dangerous act.     
Unreliable 
security 
Based on the hostile operational environment of UAV/drones, the default security 
measures are not suitable. Due to the harsh operating environment of UAV/drones, a 
robust security protocol is necessary. But due to design and resource limitations, 
improving security measures is very challenging.       
Authentication  
Based on recent events as shown in Table 6, the currently employed authentication 
methods for UAV/drone can easily be compromised. Except for the UAV/drones 
operated for defense purposes as they have trailered software to cope with the 
requirements.     
Limited 
Frequency bands 
The UAV/drones are being operated within a limited range of frequencies. Making 
them an easy target for jamming-based attacks.    
11. Open Research Areas 
Based on the earlier sections, it is clear that a lot of work is still needed in improving UAV/drone 
security. Some of the areas that are open for research are listed in Table 12. Research areas listed in 
Table 12 can play an integral part in solving several UAV/drone security concerns [85, 86]. 
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Table 12. Open Research areas for UAV/drones. 
Area Description 
Path loss Path loss and channel model to facilitate higher carrier frequencies are a concern. 
Specifically in areas that are surrounded by tall concrete buildings and have a high number 
of wireless equipment operating in the vicinity.      
Latency Keeping up with the latency requirement of less than 1 millisecond is still an ongoing 
concern. Future cellular technology needs to ensure improved facilitation in terms of 
latency for UAV/drones in emergencies.    
Reliability Ultra-reliable communication is among the most important area related to UAV/drone 
communication. With the exponential increase of UAVs/drones, reliable communication 
will be quite challenging.    
Battery 
Life 
UAV/drones, which rely on battery power need long-lasting batteries or power sources that 
are not only light but can also, provide long flight ability.   
Collision 
Avoidance 
Mobility and the ability to avoid collision are still areas that researchers are looking to 
improve for UAV/drones.   
AI 
integration 
AI can play an integral role in the future of UAVs/drones. AI cannot only assist UAVs in 
terms of security but can also provide improvement in terms of collision avoidance, data 
analysis, and security. However, due to high computational requirements, AI-based 
solutions need further research and improvements.    
12. Recommendations and Summary 
Some recommendations to improve security and privacy for UAV/drones are shown in Table 13 
and Table 14. In Table 13 general recommendations which could help in improving UAV security and 
privacy are mentioned. While Table 14 enlist the most recent block-chain-based solutions for UAV 
security and privacy. Further, the authorities and industry need to put a combined effort into 
regularizing and standardizing UAVs/drones to counter security and privacy-related issues [84, 87, 88, 
89].   
 Table 13. Recommendations for improving UAV/drone security and privacy 
Measure Description  
Licensing Every UAV/drone should be registered and licensed. Such measures will make it easy 
for the authorities to identify the owner of any harmful drone/UAV.  
Flying Permit A flying permit similar to a driving license should be issued with a registered drone/UAV. 
Such regulation would limit UAV/drone-based illegal or harmful activity.   
Education The public should be educated on the harmful or illegal use of UAV/drones.  
Laws Based on harmful and illegal events, laws should be introduced for the misuse of 
UAV/drones.  
Restricted zones Areas that are classified or could pose a danger due to drone/UAV should be marked. 
Map-based public applications should also indicate areas that are no-fly zones for 
UAV/drones.    
Non-lethal Non-lethal tools to counter drones/UAVs should be publically available. Such tools can 
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measures play an important role in urban areas.   
Machine 
Learning 
Security tools such as ML-based IDS can vastly improve the security architecture of 
drones/UAVs.   
Multi-factor 
authentication 
Rigid authentication methods can help in stopping several common security threats.  
Table 14 represent UAV’s privacy and security solutions based on blockchain. Blockchain can 
provide very effective and enhanced security for UAVs/drones [90]. The only concern for blockchain-
based solutions is the requirement of additional computational resources [91]. On the contrary, the 
enhancement in terms of security and privacy due to blockchain is more than adequate. The 
blockchain-based solution can be a very suitable option for UAVs specifically designed for defense 
and government usage. 
Table 14. Blockchain-based proposed solutions for improving UAV/drone security and 
privacy 
Reference Description  
[92] The authors in this paper proposed a novel pairing-free certificate less scheme that used the 
blockchain and smart contract to develop a novel, secure, reliable, and efficient certificate-less 
signature (CLS) scheme. The proposed model in this paper can be very useful for UAV/drone 
security against many common attack methods. 
[93] This paper presents a solution for identity authentication issues. The authors proposed an 
efficient authentication protocol based on blockchain, dynamic Join-and-Exit mechanism, 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and batch verification. 
[94] In the paper, the authors propose a covert communication model which can be an effective 
method for secure communication in UAV/drones. The proposed model uses smart contracts 
to model covert communication under the blockchain to solve the concerns of traditional covert 
communication. 
[95] In this paper, an improved method for data processing and sharing is proposed. The proposed 
method can be very useful for UAV/drone secure communication and data sharing process. 
The proposed approach in the paper can be represented by three main stages. First, the proposed 
model employs a group-agent strategy based on trust computing to improve transmission 
efficiency. Second, to improves resource allocation in each edge device the authors proposed 
a stacked task sorting and ranking mechanism. Third, the model adopts used symmetric 
searchable encryption (SSE) for a secure and efficient content model. 
[96] In this paper, the authors proposed a computationally efficient method for data integrity and 
authenticity. The proposed model is designed especially for devices with limited resources i.e 
UAV/drones, IoT, etc. The proposed method provides a secure and efficient data sharing and 
storage scheme for mobile-edge computing based on blockchain. The model uses a unique 
signature private key approach to achieve data integrity and authenticity. 
Table 15 highlights the areas discussed in this paper and a comparison with some recent survey 
papers on UAVs/drones. In Table 15 the first column represents all the topics discussed in the paper 
and the first row represents the recent survey papers reference. To highlight the significance of this 
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paper, Table 15 shows the topics discussed in other survey papers by a black dot in contrast with the 
eleven topics covered in this paper. 
Table 15. Topic comparison with recent survey papers on UAV/drone security and privacy 
concerns 
 Topics [4] [20] [32] [47] [57] [76] [82] 
1.  Regulation        
2.  Classification        
3.  Architecture and communication methods        
4.  Applications        
5.  Security Vulnerabilities and Threats        
6.  Existing Threats        
7.  Existing Solutions and Counter Measures        
8.  Physical and Logical Attacks countermeasures        
9.  Security Implementation Limitations        
10.  Open Research Areas        
11.  Recommendations        
13. Conclusion  
The trending and exponential growth in the use of UAV/drones are giving birth to an era of autonomous 
aerial vehicles. UAV/drones offer numerous advantages to both civilian and military-based domains. 
However, this increase in use and easy availability have raised serious concerns for security and 
privacy-related issues. Due to the flexibility, low cost, ease of deployment, and size it has become a 
very useful tool for cyber-attacks and other types of mischievous activities. Despite the availability of 
several countermeasures against any malicious UAV/drone, it is still very effective to carry out harmful 
activities. Privacy issues with UAV/drones are also very significant. In this age of technology, users 
and organizations are very serious when it comes to privacy. This paper presented a comprehensive 
study of UAV/drone security and privacy concerns. The paper also gave readers a brief overview of 
factors that are related to UAV/drone security and privacy concerns. In this context, different 
recommendations are suggested are also highlighted in this paper. Specifically, existing solutions based 
on blockchain are highlighted. These solutions can provide UAV/drones with improved data integrity, 
authenticity, and accessibility.      
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